A Critical Analysis of Judicial Independence Following Constitutional Amendments Through Changes in Indonesia’s Constitutional Structure

Abstract

This study aims to critically analyze the independence of judicial power following constitutional amendments through changes in Indonesia’s constitutional structure. The focus of the research is directed toward assessing the extent to which judicial institutional strengthening has been able to limit political interference in constitutional practice. This study employs a qualitative method with a normative juridical approach and a comparative research design, as judicial independence is understood as a legal concept that is not merely normative in nature but is also shaped by institutional practices and political dynamics. The comparative design is used to enrich the analysis by comparing Indonesia’s judicial system with those of Malaysia, Japan, and the Netherlands.The research is centered in Indonesia, particularly on the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, and the Judicial Commission. Data were collected through document analysis and in-depth interviews with six informants selected purposively based on their expertise and professional experience in the fields of the judiciary, academia, judicial oversight, and legal practice. The findings indicate that constitutional amendments have structurally strengthened judicial independence; however, functional independence continues to face challenges due to political influence in judicial recruitment mechanisms and inter-institutional relations among state organs. This study recommends restructuring judicial recruitment mechanisms, strengthening the role of the Judicial Commission, and reforming institutional relationship designs in order to achieve substantive judicial independence.