Judicial Independence and Constitutional Reform: An Analysis of Post-Amendment Constitutional Structure in Indonesia

Abstract

This study examines the extent to which judicial independence has been realized within Indonesia’s post-amendment constitutional structure, with the objective of critically evaluating the effectiveness of constitutional reforms in strengthening judicial autonomy. The research employs a qualitative method with a doctrinal and socio-legal research design, chosen to enable an in-depth analysis of both normative legal frameworks and their practical implementation within institutional contexts. The study is conducted in Indonesia, focusing on national-level judicial institutions, including the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and the Judicial Commission, due to their central role in shaping constitutional interpretation and judicial governance. Data were collected from eight purposively selected informants, consisting of constitutional law scholars, judges, legal practitioners, and policymakers, selected based on their expertise and direct involvement in judicial processes. The findings indicate that while constitutional reforms have successfully established formal guarantees of judicial independence, their implementation remains constrained by institutional overlap, inconsistent application of legal principles, and challenges in balancing independence with accountability. The study concludes that judicial independence in Indonesia is structurally established but functionally evolving. It recommends strengthening institutional coordination, clarifying jurisdictional boundaries, and enhancing accountability mechanisms to ensure the effective realization of judicial independence.