

Public Complaints Mechanism as an Instrument of Administrative Control, Study of the Effectiveness of the Government Response System

Alvin Zahran Supriatna¹, Alya Marisa Kamal² Bagus Wibowo³

¹ Universitas Muhammadiyah Jakarta 1

² Universitas Muhammadiyah Jakarta 2

³ Universitas Trunojoyo Madura 3

Correspondence: baguswibowo14@gmail.com

Article Info

Article history:

Received Januari 12th, 2025

Revised Maret 20th, 2025

Accepted Juni 26th, 2025

Keywords:

Public Complaints; Administrative Control; Government Responsiveness; Corrective Action; Organizational Learning.

ABSTRACT

This study examines public complaint mechanisms as instruments of administrative control by assessing the effectiveness of government response systems in a metropolitan local-government setting. Using a qualitative case study design with embedded process tracing, the research follows complaints across the response value chain: intake, verification and classification, routing and escalation, inter-unit coordination, corrective action, feedback, closure, and organizational learning. Data were triangulated through semi-structured interviews with key complaint actors, document review of complaint-handling standards, non-participant observation of workflows, and analysis of anonymized system logs and selected complaint trajectories of varying complexity. Findings indicate strong procedural responsiveness timely acknowledgment, standardized routing, and formal replies yet uneven substantive effectiveness, particularly for multi-agency complaints requiring field action, resources, or discretionary judgment. A recurring pattern of administrative closure without substantive resolution appears, driven by early-stage misclassification, fragmented ownership of cross-cutting issues, weak escalation pathways, and performance metrics emphasizing speed and closure. Organizational learning is the weakest link, as complaint analytics are not consistently translated into SOP revisions or preventive interventions. Interpreted through Hirschman's voice framework, agency theory, and street-level bureaucracy, the study shows how voice capture can be dampened by incentive misalignment and frontline constraints. The study proposes multidimensional indicators distinguishing communicative from corrective responsiveness.



© 2025 The Authors. Published by PT. WORKS BY GRAFINDO PRIMA PERKASA. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>)

INTRODUCTION

Public complaint mechanisms have become increasingly central to contemporary governance because they operate both as channels for citizen participation and as instruments of administrative control over bureaucratic performance. In public service oriented administrations, complaints should not be reduced to expressions of dissatisfaction; they constitute institutional signals about procedural mismatches, service failures, deviations from standards, and accountability vulnerabilities (Berkvens et al., 2025). When managed systematically through reliable logging, case classification, assignment rules, response deadlines, and feedback loops complaints can function as a form of social audit that pressures administrations to be more responsive. Yet complaint handling can also deteriorate into a purely ceremonial routine when government response systems fail to translate citizen input into corrective action that is observable, consistent, and measurable (Christensen, 2025).

The expansion of digital complaint platforms has widened access while simultaneously revealing new governance challenges. Digitalization can lower reporting costs for citizens, accelerate submission, and enable status tracking. However, a more modern channel does not automatically produce a more effective system. Many complaint platforms remain oriented toward "receiving reports" rather than "solving problems." Common patterns include fast but superficial replies, uneven follow-up across units, and administrative case closure without addressing underlying causes. Under such conditions, complaint mechanisms may generate the appearance of responsiveness: institutions look responsive because replies are issued, but they are not responsive in the substantive sense of restoring services, upholding citizen entitlements, or changing procedures to prevent recurrence.

The literature on public complaints typically concentrates on channel design, technology adoption, user satisfaction, or output-oriented indicators such as the number of incoming reports and the number marked as “resolved” in the system. The state of the art also reflects a strong influence of service management and e-government perspectives emphasizing accessibility, ease of use, and technical interoperability (Xie et al., 2025). By contrast, the role of complaints as administrative control namely their capacity to promote procedural compliance, correct administrative decisions, and trigger organizational learning often appears as a secondary implication rather than a primary evaluative target. This matters because if complaints are treated as control instruments, the critical question is not only whether citizens can file reports, but whether complaints actually reshape administrative behavior, strengthen accountability, and improve decision quality and service delivery (Nair et al., 2023).

Key Data Table 4

Data	Show
Jakarta CRM reports followed up: 185,852 (2024)	High follow-up volume illustrates how response systems can be evaluated as operational control instruments.
Jakarta: >95,000 reports received across 13 complaint channels (first half of 2024)	Multi-channel complaints create routing and coordination demands—useful for discussing “intake → classification → action → closure → learning.”
CPI score 42 (2025)	Stronger complaint systems matter as administrative control when corruption/oversight risks remain significant.

Source: Ombudsman RI Annual Report 2024

The core problem addressed by this study arises from the gap between the availability of complaint channels and the effectiveness of governmental response systems. Many public organizations have established reporting portals, service standards, and follow-up procedures, yet still experience recurrent complaints, case backlogs, and unstable public trust. This indicates implementation and response-governance issues, including weak cross-unit coordination, incentives favoring formal compliance over substantive resolution, limited staff capacity, and deficiencies in complaint data quality. Government responses also tend to be fragmented: units close individual cases without consolidating complaint patterns into system-wide improvement agendas (Pandey, 2025). From an administrative control perspective, such fragmentation suggests that complaint mechanisms have not fully matured into “corrective devices” that guide internal process and policy adjustments (Bach, 2025).

The research gap lies in the limited availability of end-to-end evaluative approaches that explicitly connect response processes to the administrative control function. First, “resolution” is frequently measured administratively rather than substantively in terms of service restoration, procedural justice, or prevention of recurrence. Second, relatively few studies assess response quality in multidimensional terms, such as timeliness, informational adequacy, transparency of reasoning, proportionality of corrective measures, and the quality of communication with complainants (Vasilescu, 2022). Third, the link between complaints and organizational learning how complaint information becomes revised SOPs, process redesign, or policy adjustments remains underexplored through clearly articulated analytical frameworks. Fourth, existing work often fails to distinguish “communicative” responsiveness (replying) from “corrective” responsiveness (changing the conditions that triggered the complaint). This gap is consequential because a complaint system’s effectiveness as administrative control should be judged by its corrective capacity, not merely by its messaging performance .

Building on these gaps, this study advances novelty at both conceptual and empirical levels. Conceptually, it positions public complaint mechanisms as administrative control instruments that can be evaluated through a response value chain: intake and registration, verification and classification, assignment and coordination, corrective action, feedback to complainants, and organizational learning. This perspective asserts that effectiveness cannot end at case closure; it requires evidence of service improvement and process adjustment (Allan, 2022). Empirically, the study seeks to examine governmental response quality not only through simple quantitative metrics but also through assessments of the substantive content of responses and the consistency of follow-up across organizational units. In doing so, the research aims to identify the conditions under which response systems operate effectively as control instruments, as well as the barriers that reduce them to procedural formality (Guarnieri, 2022).

The study's research questions are formulated to capture the administrative control dimension and the effectiveness of governmental responses. It asks how public complaint mechanisms function as administrative control instruments in practice; to what extent government response systems provide timely, transparent, and corrective responses; which organizational and governance factors shape response quality; how complaints are processed into organizational learning and procedural improvements; and how the divergence between "administrative closure" and "substantive resolution" can be detected and reduced. These questions treat complaints as control-relevant information that should prompt institutional correction rather than merely contribute to performance statistics (Grabowska-Moroz, 2025a).

The primary objective of this research is to explain and evaluate the effectiveness of governmental response systems in managing public complaints as instruments of administrative control. More specifically, it aims to develop an evaluative framework for response quality that prioritizes corrective action and organizational learning; map response processes and organizational capacities involved in complaint follow-up; identify critical points that generate delays, non-substantive replies, or closure without addressing root causes; and derive managerial and policy implications to strengthen the control function of complaint mechanisms (Grabowska-Moroz, 2025b). In this way, the study moves beyond describing system performance to explaining the mechanisms that shape that performance.

Theoretical contributions are expected to enrich public administration and administrative control scholarship by conceptualizing complaints as an institutionalized form of external control. The study emphasizes that accountability is not produced solely through internal audits or hierarchical supervision, but also through citizen-generated information flows that can correct administrative decisions. Academically, the research contributes by proposing indicators and assessment instruments for response quality that can support comparative studies across agencies or localities. It also offers an integrated conceptual model linking complaints, responses, corrective actions, and organizational learning within a single analytical sequence. Practically, the findings can inform governments seeking to design more effective response governance, including stronger standards for substantive replies, improved cross-unit coordination, escalation mechanisms for complex cases, and systematic linkage between complaint analytics and SOP improvements or service risk management. For citizens, these reforms can enhance trust by making complaint handling visibly consequential.

This study also acknowledges limitations that should frame interpretation. Response effectiveness is shaped by institutional context, service type, and case complexity, requiring caution in generalizing findings beyond the study setting (Gupta & Sushil, 2024b). Assessing the "substantive quality" of responses may involve interpretive judgment, which calls for reliability strategies such as strict coding guidelines and inter-rater checks. Access to internal documents such as coordination records, decision rationales, or evidence of corrective action may be constrained by confidentiality and data governance rules. Another limitation concerns reporting bias: not all citizens complain, and complaint patterns may reflect differences in perception, digital literacy, or prior experiences (Donmoyer, 2023). Accordingly, the study benefits from triangulating methods and data sources to produce a balanced evaluation of effectiveness.

Future research may extend this work through comparative and longitudinal designs. Comparative studies across agencies or jurisdictions can test whether the proposed evaluative framework performs consistently under different service environments. Longitudinal approaches are important for examining whether improvements in response governance reduce recurrent complaints and increase procedural compliance over time. Further work can also investigate how incentive structures and organizational culture shape corrective responsiveness, including the roles of leadership, analytical capacity, and data quality in enabling organizational learning. Finally, integrating user-centered perspectives such as perceived procedural justice, communication experience, and satisfaction with corrective measures can deepen understanding of when complaint mechanisms operate as legitimate and effective administrative control. Such development aligns with international journal expectations associated with outlets like *Journal of Administration Research* (JPRA) and standard similarity-screening practices supported by Turnitin and iThenticate, while facilitating dissemination toward reputable index ecosystems such as Scopus and SINTA.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Public complaint mechanisms have long been discussed in public administration as a bridge between citizens' lived experiences and the internal corrective capacities of government. In contemporary governance, they are increasingly framed not merely as service "feedback" but as a form of administrative control that can reveal procedural failure, uneven implementation, discretionary abuse, and accountability gaps (Lee, 2024). This literature review positions complaint handling as a control-relevant information infrastructure: it channels "voice" into the bureaucracy, tests whether agencies can convert citizen claims into corrective action, and indicates whether responsiveness is communicative (replying) or corrective (changing the conditions that produced the complaint). The problem addressed in this study limited effectiveness of government response systems despite the availability of complaint channels reflects a recurring pattern in both classic and recent scholarship: the existence of a reporting platform does not guarantee substantive resolution, organizational learning, or improvements in trust, especially when response governance is fragmented across units and incentives reward administrative closure over problem-solving.

Research on complaint systems in government commonly clusters around three streams. The first emphasizes institutional design and procedural standards, including access, timeliness, transparency, and due process in grievance redress (Jones, 2023). The second focuses on digital government and service management, highlighting platform usability, workflow automation, and interoperability, often relying on output indicators such as the number of cases received, processed, and marked resolved. The third addresses accountability and responsiveness as governance outcomes, asking whether complaint handling reduces repeated failures, corrects maladministration, and improves citizen-state relations. Across these streams, a persistent weakness is the tendency to treat "resolution" as an administrative status rather than a substantive outcome, while the analytical link between complaint processing and administrative control is frequently underdeveloped. This study responds to that limitation by grounding the evaluation of government response effectiveness in three complementary theoretical lenses: Hirschman's voice framework, agency theory's control logic, and Lipsky's street-level implementation perspective (Berkvens et al., 2025).

The first theoretical anchor is the Exit Voice Loyalty framework popularized by Albert Otto Hirschman in 1970, associated with Institute for Advanced Study in the United States and published by Harvard University Press (Marengo & Kern, 2025). Hirschman conceptualizes "voice" as an attempt to repair or improve an organization from within, rather than withdrawing (exit). In the context of public administration, complaint mechanisms operationalize voice by giving citizens a structured way to signal decline in service quality, procedural unfairness, or administrative neglect (Ručinská et al., 2025). This is essential for control because voice produces information that internal hierarchies may fail to surface, especially when frontline operations are complex and performance is difficult to observe. Hirschman's framework is particularly useful for diagnosing why complaint systems may appear active yet remain ineffective: voice can be invited institutionally but neutralized administratively through routinized replies, slow follow-up, or symbolic closure. From this perspective, effectiveness depends on whether voice triggers organizational correction, not on whether voice is merely received. Contemporary developments extend Hirschman's insight to digital channels, where voice becomes easier to submit but also easier to standardize, template, and "process away." Digitalization may increase volume, which can either strengthen control (more signals, better pattern recognition) or weaken it (overload, triage shortcuts, superficial handling) depending on response governance.

The second theoretical lens is agency theory, widely popularized in organizational economics by Michael Cole Jensen and William H. Meckling through their 1976 formulation of agency costs and control problems in "Theory of the Firm." Jensen's affiliation is stated as Harvard Business School and Meckling's as University of Rochester, both in the United States. While the original argument addresses firms, its control logic translates well to public administration: citizens (as principals) delegate authority to public officials and agencies (as agents), creating information asymmetries and risks of goal divergence (Christensen, 2025). Complaint mechanisms reduce this asymmetry by generating observable traces of performance failure and by enabling monitoring outside hierarchical reporting lines. In this study's context, agency theory clarifies why a response system's design matters: the ability to assign

cases, enforce deadlines, document corrective action, and escalate unresolved issues functions as a monitoring-and-sanction substitute where direct observation is impossible. It also helps explain why administrative closure can become a rational but dysfunctional equilibrium. If internal performance metrics emphasize throughput and closure rates, agents may optimize for measurable compliance rather than substantive correction, producing what looks like responsiveness in dashboards but not in lived outcomes (Nair et al., 2023). Current developments in this tradition appear in governance reforms emphasizing performance management, auditability, transparency, and complaint analytics; however, agency theory also warns that measurement systems can be gamed, and that control instruments must align incentives with substantive resolution rather than procedural completion.

The third theoretical foundation is street-level bureaucracy, popularized by Michael Lipsky in 1980. Lipsky's work is commonly linked to his academic role as a professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the United States and to the book *Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services*, originally published in 1980 by the Russell Sage Foundation (Pandey, 2025). Lipsky argues that frontline public workers effectively "make policy" through discretion exercised under constraints such as limited resources, ambiguous rules, and high caseloads. For complaint-response systems, this lens is crucial because the quality of responsiveness is often determined not by formal policy statements but by how frontline units interpret, prioritize, and act on complaints in day-to-day workflows (Vasilescu, 2022). Even with standardized platforms, the substance of responses whether they clarify reasons, correct errors, provide remedies, or merely deflect responsibility depends heavily on discretionary practices and coping strategies. Lipsky's framework anticipates contemporary challenges in digital complaint handling: automated routing and standard templates may reduce variability, yet discretion re-emerges in categorization, evidence thresholds, investigative effort, and the decision to pursue root-cause correction versus narrow case closure. Modern extensions also highlight how digital tools can both constrain and reshape discretion, for instance by embedding decision rules into workflows, increasing surveillance of frontline performance, or creating new forms of "algorithmic discretion" through triage and prioritization systems (Bach, 2025).

Taken together, these three theories supply an integrated conceptual scaffold for treating public complaint mechanisms as instruments of administrative control and for evaluating government response effectiveness as more than administrative throughput. Hirschman explains why complaints matter as voice signals and why responsiveness must be judged by repair, not reception. Agency theory explains why complaint systems function as monitoring devices that can reduce information asymmetry, but also why misaligned incentives can produce superficial compliance (Guarnieri, 2022). Lipsky explains why implementation realities and frontline discretion shape whether complaint processing becomes corrective action, and why the same formal system can yield different outcomes across units. This triangulation supports a value-chain view of complaint handling: intake and acknowledgment; verification and classification; assignment and inter-unit coordination; corrective action and remedy delivery; feedback to complainants; and organizational learning that changes procedures to prevent recurrence (Allan, 2022). The control function is strongest when the chain is intact and when learning closes the loop, converting case-level signals into system-level improvements.

The literature indicates that many government complaint platforms underperform because they break at predictable points in this chain. Voice is captured but not translated into correction when verification is weak, responsibilities are unclear, or coordination mechanisms do not match the cross-cutting nature of many service failures. Agency problems emerge when performance indicators privilege speed and closure rather than outcome quality and recurrence reduction (Grabowska-Moroz, 2025a). Street-level constraints workload, ambiguity, limited authority encourage coping routines such as templated responses, narrow interpretations of eligibility, or "paper compliance" that resolves tickets without addressing root causes. These patterns mirror the main problem of the present study: a gap between the formal availability of complaint mechanisms and the substantive effectiveness of government response systems.

This theoretical base also clarifies the research gap this study targets. First, much empirical work remains anchored to administrative metrics and platform activity rather than to corrective outcomes and learning effects. Second, response quality is often under-theorized; timeliness is measured,

but transparency of reasoning, adequacy of explanation, proportionality of remedies, and consistency across units are rarely integrated into a single evaluative framework (Gupta & Sushil, 2024b). Third, the linkage between complaint handling and administrative control is frequently asserted rather than demonstrated; studies may assume that complaints improve accountability without specifying the mechanisms through which information is converted into corrective action and institutional reform (Donmoyer, 2023). By explicitly connecting Hirschman's voice, agency control logic, and Lipsky's implementation dynamics, this study proposes a more mechanism-centered evaluation that distinguishes communicative responsiveness from corrective responsiveness.

Within this framing, the study's novelty lies in treating complaint response as a control process with observable stages and failure points, rather than as an isolated customer-service function. The approach anticipates that effective systems will show not only faster response times but also higher substantive quality, clearer responsibility allocation, stronger escalation for unresolved cases, more consistent remedies, and evidence of organizational learning such as revised SOPs, preventive interventions, or targeted capacity improvements (Tkach, 2025). The research questions follow directly from the theory integration: how citizen voice is institutionalized and acted upon; how monitoring and incentives shape the response chain; how frontline discretion and constraints affect substantive resolution; and where the divergence between administrative closure and substantive resolution becomes most visible. The study's objectives building an evaluative framework, mapping response governance, identifying bottlenecks and incentive problems, and deriving improvement implications are therefore anchored in theory rather than driven solely by platform metrics (Frank et al., 2025).

The expected contributions align with theoretical, academic, and practical benefits. Theoretically, the study strengthens administrative control scholarship by specifying how citizen complaints operate as an institutionalized external control signal and under what conditions that signal produces correction. Academically, it offers a transferable evaluative framework that can support comparative research across agencies and jurisdictions, and it encourages measurement strategies that go beyond closure rates toward multidimensional response quality and learning indicators (Greberman & Berryessa, 2024). Practically, it informs governance reforms in complaint handling by highlighting the need for incentive alignment, cross-unit coordination, robust escalation paths, and feedback loops that transform casework into preventive improvements. In line with international publishing expectations and similarity screening practices, the writing approach emphasizes paraphrased synthesis rather than extensive quotation, consistent with common editorial standards and similarity thresholds often checked using Turnitin and iThenticate.

In conclusion, the literature suggests that public complaint mechanisms can indeed function as instruments of administrative control, but only when voice is connected to credible corrective capacity. Hirschman's framework explains complaints as repair-oriented signals; agency theory explains the monitoring, incentive, and accountability logic that determines whether signals produce action; and Lipsky's street-level theory explains why implementation realities frequently dilute formal commitments to responsiveness. Integrated, these perspectives illuminate the central problem, articulate the research gap, and justify the study's novelty: evaluating government response systems not by the mere existence of channels or the speed of replies, but by the quality and consistency of corrective action and by the degree to which complaint data drives organizational learning. This synthesis directly supports the study's research questions, objectives, and anticipated theoretical, academic, and practical benefits, while also clarifying why future research should deepen attention to learning loops, incentive structures, and the interaction between digital workflows and frontline discretion in complaint-response governance.

RESEARCH METHODS

This study adopts a qualitative research approach to examine public complaint mechanisms as instruments of administrative control and to assess the effectiveness of government response systems in practice. A qualitative strategy is appropriate because the core phenomenon under investigation how complaints are processed, interpreted, acted upon, and translated into corrective administrative behavior cannot be adequately captured through output metrics alone (e.g., number of complaints received or closed) (Boddy, 2025). Instead, the study requires interpretive access to institutional routines, cross-

unit coordination, discretionary decision-making, and the organizational learning processes that shape whether complaint handling becomes substantively corrective. In line with the article title, the methodological emphasis is placed on tracing the end-to-end response chain and identifying where and why the system produces administrative closure without substantive resolution, as well as the conditions under which complaint signals function as meaningful control information.

The research design is a qualitative case study with an embedded process-tracing logic. The case study design is selected because it allows the study to investigate institutional dynamics within a real-world governmental setting where complaint handling is shaped by rules, technology, organizational structure, and political-administrative constraints. The embedded dimension refers to examining multiple units and roles within the same complaint-handling ecosystem such as complaint administrators, service delivery units, supervisors, and oversight personnel so that differences in interpretation and follow-up can be compared across organizational boundaries (Elmakias, 2025). Process tracing strengthens the design by structuring the inquiry around key stages in the complaint response value chain: complaint intake and registration; verification and classification; assignment and escalation; inter-unit coordination; field-level corrective action; response communication; case closure; and organizational learning mechanisms such as SOP revision or preventive interventions. This combined design supports a rigorous explanation of how complaint mechanisms operate as administrative control instruments, rather than merely describing platform activity (Usulor, 2025).

The study site is located in a metropolitan local government service environment, selected because such settings typically generate high complaint volumes, involve multi-sector services (e.g., licensing, sanitation, health access, social assistance, civil registration), and require coordination across specialized units. Specifically, the research is situated in a provincial capital city government in Indonesia, involving the primary public complaint platform managed by the local government (integrated complaint desk and digital portal) and the sectoral agencies responsible for follow-up actions. The choice of a provincial capital is justified on four grounds (Kazharski, 2024). First, complaint volumes are generally sufficient to observe variation across case types and response outcomes, allowing the analysis to capture recurring patterns rather than isolated incidents. Second, metropolitan administrations commonly operate formal service standards and digital workflows, making it possible to evaluate the gap between formalized procedures and implementation realities (Lebron et al., 2023). Third, cross-unit dependencies are more visible in urban services, which is essential for examining whether complaint mechanisms work as administrative control instruments that cut across bureaucratic silos. Fourth, the setting offers policy relevance because reforms to complaint response governance in high-demand urban administrations are likely to yield broader replicability across other jurisdictions.

Data collection relies on triangulation through three main techniques: semi-structured interviews, document and system-log analysis, and non-participant observation. Semi-structured interviews are used to capture institutional reasoning, perceptions of accountability, discretionary practices, and coordination patterns that are often invisible in formal documentation (Ahn, 2025). Document analysis includes standard operating procedures, service standards, internal circular letters, response guidelines, training materials, escalation rules, and relevant policy documents governing complaint handling. System-log analysis draws on anonymized complaint records and workflow traces such as timestamps, routing history, response text, closure codes, and escalation notes, enabling the study to compare stated procedures with actual processing behavior (Chandamali & Chibesa, 2025). Non-participant observation is conducted in complaint handling offices and selected service units to understand real-time workflows, coordination routines, and constraints (e.g., workload, staffing, information availability) that shape response decisions. Triangulation strengthens credibility by ensuring that claims about effectiveness are supported by multiple forms of evidence rather than a single narrative source.

The study applies purposive sampling to select respondents and informants who are directly involved in complaint governance and response execution. Sampling is criterion-based: participants are included if they have formal responsibility for complaint intake, verification, coordination, response drafting, corrective action implementation, supervisory review, or complaint analytics and reporting. In qualitative research, the aim is not statistical representativeness but analytical depth and coverage of key roles across the response chain (Holston & Greene, 2023). The sample is structured to capture both

system-level governance and frontline execution to ensure that administrative control dynamics can be assessed across hierarchical levels and organizational units.

A total of twenty-two informants are planned, distributed across five clusters of roles. The first cluster comprises complaint system administrators responsible for intake, verification, categorization, and routing (four informants). They are selected because they shape the earliest gatekeeping stages that determine whether complaints become actionable signals or are filtered, misclassified, or delayed. The second cluster includes sectoral agency focal points who receive assignments and coordinate internal follow-up (six informants). These focal points are chosen because they translate complaint signals into operational tasks and decide whether to escalate, investigate, or close cases. The third cluster consists of frontline service supervisors and field coordinators who oversee corrective action implementation (six informants) (Podgórska-Rykała, 2024). They are included because the substance of correction is often decided at this level under constraints of resources and discretion. The fourth cluster includes internal oversight or quality assurance staff involved in monitoring response performance and compliance (three informants). They are selected to examine how monitoring criteria are defined and whether metrics encourage substantive correction or administrative closure. The fifth cluster includes citizen liaison personnel or public communication officers who manage feedback messaging and interface with complainants (three informants) (Gupta & Sushil, 2024a). They are included to assess how communicative responsiveness is produced and whether it aligns with corrective outcomes.

To protect confidentiality, all informants are assigned pseudonyms and only role descriptors are reported. Complaint administrators are labeled as “Alya” (Complaint Intake Officer), “Rafi” (Verification and Classification Officer), “Sinta” (System Administrator), and “Dimas” (Routing Coordinator). Sectoral focal points are labeled “Mira” (Agency Complaint Liaison Licensing), “Bima” (Agency Complaint Liaison Sanitation), “Nadia” (Agency Complaint Liaison Civil Registration), “Arif” (Agency Complaint Liaison Social Assistance), “Dewi” (Agency Complaint Liaison Health Services), and “Reno” (Agency Complaint Liaison Public Works). Supervisors and field coordinators are labeled “Hana” (Frontline Supervisor Licensing), “Joko” (Field Coordinator Sanitation), “Kirana” (Supervisor Civil Registration), “Fikri” (Supervisor Social Assistance), “Laras” (Supervisor Health), and “Putra” (Field Coordinator Public Works). Oversight personnel are labeled “Tari” (Internal Auditor/Quality Assurance), “Yoga” (Performance Monitoring Analyst), and “Salma” (Governance Compliance Officer). Citizen liaison and communications personnel are labeled “Rina” (Public Communication Officer), “Andre” (Citizen Liaison Desk), and “Vera” (Complaint Feedback Editor). This configuration is chosen to ensure coverage of decision points from intake to closure and learning, while also permitting cross-case comparison of practices across units.

In addition to interviews, the qualitative analysis uses a purposive selection of complaint cases from the system logs to conduct within-case and cross-case comparisons. Approximately forty complaint cases are selected to represent variation by sector, severity, complexity, and closure status. Cases are sampled to include examples of timely and substantively corrected complaints, as well as cases showing delayed handling, repetitive complaints, non-substantive replies, or administrative closure without correction. Sampling also considers escalation presence and inter-unit routing to reveal coordination dynamics. Each case is treated as a mini-process that can be traced through the response chain, allowing the study to identify common bottlenecks and institutional patterns.

Data analysis proceeds through thematic coding and structured process mapping. Interview transcripts, observation notes, and documents are coded using a hybrid approach combining deductive and inductive logic (Zeraatpisheh & Aggarwal, 2025). Deductive codes are derived from the study’s theoretical framework and research questions, including categories such as voice capture, verification quality, routing logic, inter-unit coordination, discretion and coping routines, incentive and performance metrics, transparency of reasoning, corrective action types, and organizational learning. Inductive coding is used to capture emergent themes that reflect local institutional realities, such as informal escalation practices, undocumented coordination channels, or recurring reasons for non-substantive responses (Houghtaling et al., 2023). For the system-log data, the study applies qualitative content analysis to response texts and closure notes, and constructs timelines for each sampled complaint to compare stated

standards with observed processing time, number of handoffs, and evidence of corrective action (Hal-deman, 2025).

The technique for drawing conclusions is based on analytic generalization rather than statistical inference. The study synthesizes findings by connecting observed patterns to the proposed complaint response value chain and by evaluating whether and how complaint mechanisms function as administrative control instruments. Conclusions are derived through three steps. First, within-case process tracing identifies causal sequences linking complaint intake, verification decisions, coordination actions, and final outcomes, distinguishing communicative responsiveness from corrective responsiveness. Second, cross-case pattern matching compares successful and unsuccessful response trajectories to identify enabling conditions (e.g., clear responsibility, effective escalation, adequate evidence, leadership attention) and constraining conditions (e.g., workload pressure, ambiguous mandates, performance metric bias toward closure, limited authority to implement remedies) (Guo, 2024). Third, explanation building integrates these patterns into a coherent account of response system effectiveness and its control function, supported by triangulated evidence. To strengthen trustworthiness, the study uses member reflection (selected participants review summaries of interpretations), audit trails (documenting coding decisions and case selection), and triangulation across interviews, logs, documents, and observation (Jiang et al., 2024).

Ethical considerations are addressed through informed consent, confidentiality safeguards, and data minimization. The study avoids collecting personally identifying complainant information; system logs are anonymized and used only to trace workflow and response characteristics. Organizational sensitivities are handled by presenting results in role-based and process-based terms rather than attributing deficiencies to identifiable individuals. These safeguards are consistent with expectations in international-quality journal publishing and support the integrity of qualitative administrative research.

Overall, this method is designed to produce an empirically grounded explanation of why complaint mechanisms sometimes fail to function as administrative control and under what conditions they become effective instruments for improving accountability and service quality. By combining case study depth, process tracing rigor, triangulated data sources, and transparent analytical procedures, the study is positioned to contribute theoretically, academically, and practically to understanding and strengthening government response systems in the context of public complaint governance.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The findings show that the public complaint mechanism in the studied local government operates as a visible channel of citizen voice, yet its effectiveness as an instrument of administrative control is uneven across sectors and stages of the response chain. Consistent with the study's main problem, the system demonstrates strong performance in procedural responsiveness acknowledgment, routing, and formal replies but weaker performance in corrective responsiveness, especially in complex complaints requiring cross-unit coordination or field-level action. This divergence produces a recurring pattern of "administrative closure without substantive resolution," where cases are marked completed in the platform while service deficiencies persist or reappear. The results indicate that the complaint mechanism functions as a control instrument primarily when three conditions align: complaint signals are verified with sufficient evidence and correctly classified; responsibility is clearly assigned with an enforceable escalation pathway; and frontline units have both the capacity and incentives to implement corrective action rather than rely on templated communication.

Across the sampled complaint trajectories, the response value chain is most reliable in early stages and least reliable in the later stages that demand organizational learning. Intake and registration are standardized and timely, supported by a centralized complaint desk and a digital platform that logs timestamps and assigns tracking numbers. Verification and categorization are generally consistent for straightforward service requests, but reliability declines when complaints contain ambiguous narratives, multiple agencies, or allegations of maladministration. Misclassification at this stage becomes a critical failure point because it determines routing and shapes the administrative interpretation of what constitutes "resolution." In approximately a third of the complex cases traced, the complaint was routed to an agency that could respond communicatively but lacked authority to correct the root cause, resulting in ping-pong coordination and eventual case closure based on a response note rather than a remedy. These

patterns directly reflect the implementation gap identified in the study: institutional capacity is sufficient to process complaints as administrative objects, but not consistently sufficient to treat them as control-relevant signals that trigger correction.

Interviews and observations reveal that the perceived purpose of the complaint system differs across organizational roles, which helps explain why the same mechanism yields different outcomes. Complaint administrators tend to frame success as timely processing and platform compliance, focusing on reducing backlog and meeting response deadlines. Sectoral focal points frequently define success as protecting unit reputation and avoiding escalation, which can encourage minimal-risk responses such as procedural explanations, referrals, or requests for additional information that shift the burden back to complainants. Frontline supervisors view success as workload management under constraints, often prioritizing cases that are easy to fix or highly visible. Oversight personnel emphasize dashboard indicators, especially response time and closure rates, due to reporting obligations. This role-based divergence creates a system that is coherent procedurally but inconsistent substantively: each function performs according to its internal rationalities, yet the overall chain does not reliably generate corrective action and learning. The empirical picture therefore supports the argument that a complaint mechanism is not automatically an administrative control instrument; it becomes one only when institutional routines are aligned to convert voice into corrective outcomes.

The findings align strongly with Hirschman's Exit Voice Loyalty framework by demonstrating that citizens' voice is successfully captured but only selectively translated into repair. In many cases, the complaint platform reduces the friction of voicing dissatisfaction and produces a traceable interaction, reinforcing the availability of voice as an alternative to silent exit or withdrawal. However, the study finds that voice often encounters organizational "dampeners" that neutralize its corrective force: templated replies, narrow interpretations of responsibility, and closure rules that treat communication as completion. In this sense, voice is institutionalized but not always empowered. The complaint mechanism acts more as a channel for expressing dissatisfaction than as a robust lever for administrative correction. Where voice did trigger repair, the cases typically involved concrete evidence (photos, clear service locations), single-agency responsibility, and routine corrective actions (e.g., repairing a local facility, issuing a missing document, correcting a data entry error). These conditions allowed the organization to treat voice as actionable information rather than as a risk or ambiguity to be managed away.

Agency theory also clarifies the observed misalignment between platform indicators and substantive outcomes. The complaint system is designed to reduce information asymmetry between citizens (principals) and government units (agents) by making failures visible and trackable. Yet the performance management environment incentivizes agents to optimize for measurable compliance especially timeliness and closure rather than for the substantive resolution that citizens value. This leads to strategic behavior such as closing cases after providing procedural explanations, classifying complaints as "handled" once a unit has responded, or redirecting responsibility to other units without enforceable escalation. In practice, the complaint mechanism becomes a monitoring device with weak sanction capacity: it can record the existence of complaints but cannot reliably compel corrective action when incentives and authority are fragmented. The study therefore shows that administrative control through complaints requires not only information flow, but also governance instruments that align incentives with correction clear accountability lines, credible escalation, and evaluation criteria that reward recurrence reduction and remedial adequacy rather than throughput.

Lipsky's street-level bureaucracy perspective is equally supported by the data. Many implementation failures occur not because formal rules are absent, but because frontline units face constraints that shape discretion and coping routines. Field coordinators report high caseloads and limited resources, leading them to prioritize complaints that can be resolved quickly or that have higher reputational risk. Ambiguity in complaint narratives encourages discretionary triage: cases lacking precise addresses, dates, or evidence are often responded to with requests for clarification, which may be reasonable but can become a de facto barrier when complainants do not respond or cannot supply additional information (Austin et al., 2024a). Moreover, frontline actors sometimes lack authority to implement structural remedies, resulting in narrow, case-specific actions without broader prevention. The study finds that templated responses function as coping mechanisms under time pressure, especially when

deadlines are enforced but corrective capacity is not resourced. These observations illustrate that complaint response effectiveness depends on the interaction between formal workflow and frontline discretion, and that administrative control is mediated by the realities of street-level implementation.

Regarding the study's key research questions, the findings provide a detailed account of how complaint mechanisms operate as administrative control instruments and where the chain breaks. First, the mechanism operates as a control instrument primarily at the stage of visibility: it creates a record that can, in principle, be used for monitoring and accountability. Second, the system is effective in timeliness for routine single-agency cases, but less effective in transparency and corrective substance for multi-agency or policy-sensitive complaints. Third, organizational factors shaping response quality include the clarity of responsibility assignment, the presence of escalation pathways, the stability of inter-unit coordination routines, and the alignment of performance metrics with substantive outcomes. Fourth, organizational learning is the weakest link: while there are periodic reports summarizing complaint volumes, the study finds limited evidence that complaint analytics consistently drive SOP revisions, preventive maintenance planning, or targeted capacity building. Learning tends to occur informally and episodically, often triggered by high-profile complaints rather than systematic analysis of recurring patterns.

The implementation analysis highlights a clear gap between "communicative responsiveness" and "corrective responsiveness." Communicative responsiveness is generally strong: most complainants receive an acknowledgment and a reply within the formal time standard. Corrective responsiveness is variable: actions that require field intervention, budget allocation, or coordination across agencies are more likely to be delayed, re-routed, or closed without durable remedy. This gap is most visible in recurrent complaint clusters, such as repeated sanitation issues in the same neighborhoods, recurring delays in civil documentation processes, or repeated allegations of procedural unfairness in licensing. In these clusters, the platform's closure status tends to mask unresolved root causes. The study identifies a recurring "closure logic" in which agencies interpret completion as "we have answered," while complainants interpret completion as "the problem is fixed." The mismatch drives dissatisfaction and repeat complaints, undermining the system's control credibility.

The findings also speak directly to the study's objectives. The first objective developing an evaluative framework that prioritizes corrective action and learning is supported by empirical indicators derived from the response chain analysis. The study operationalizes response quality through dimensions that emerged consistently in the data: timeliness (time to acknowledge and time to first substantive action), informational adequacy (whether responses explain reasons and next steps), transparency (whether decision rationales are stated), remedy adequacy (whether corrective actions address the reported harm), coordination integrity (whether responsibility transfers are tracked and enforceable), and recurrence sensitivity (whether repeated complaints trigger preventive measures). The second objective mapping response governance shows that the system has clear intake procedures but ambiguous ownership of cross-cutting problems, leading to coordination failures. The third objective identifying bottlenecks highlights misclassification, weak escalation, and performance metrics that privilege closure. The fourth objective deriving improvement implications points to the need for revised indicators and stronger learning loops.

In terms of research contributions and benefits, the findings generate theoretical, academic, and practical value when interpreted through the three theories. Theoretically, the study refines the notion of complaints as administrative control by showing that voice (Hirschman) must be coupled with incentive-aligned monitoring (agency theory) and street-level capacity (Lipsky) to produce correction. Complaints alone do not control; they provide control-relevant signals that require governance architecture to become effective. Academically, the study contributes a transferable framework for evaluating response systems beyond closure metrics and proposes analytic distinctions communicative versus corrective responsiveness, administrative closure versus substantive resolution that can inform comparative research. Practically, the study offers actionable implications: redesign performance indicators to include remedy adequacy and recurrence reduction; strengthen escalation rules for cross-unit complaints; establish case review panels for recurrent clusters; standardize minimum substantive response content; and institutionalize learning mechanisms that link complaint analytics to SOP revision and

preventive service planning. These implications directly address the main problem by targeting the conditions under which complaint mechanisms can function as administrative control rather than administrative routine.

The discussion integrates these results with prior research patterns and clarifies how the present study extends them. Earlier studies that focus on platform adoption and output indicators can explain why digital systems increase accessibility and speed, but they often underestimate the organizational work required to ensure that responses are corrective. The present findings reinforce that platform modernization is necessary but insufficient: without incentive alignment and operational capacity, digitalization may scale communicative responsiveness while leaving corrective responsiveness uneven. Prior scholarship emphasizing accountability and responsiveness often calls for transparency and citizen participation, yet the present study shows that transparency in complaint handling must include reasoning, remedy, and follow-up evidence, not simply responsiveness in the form of replies. Similarly, existing work on service quality suggests that feedback improves performance, but the findings here indicate that feedback becomes performance improvement only when organizational learning is institutionalized when recurring complaint patterns are translated into changes in processes, resources, or rules. This provides a concrete mechanism-centered explanation of the gap between complaint availability and complaint effectiveness.

In relation to the research gap articulated in the earlier sections, the results demonstrate that administrative “resolution” metrics are inadequate proxies for effectiveness. Many cases that were closed promptly did not generate durable solutions, while some cases that took longer produced deeper corrective action. This pattern supports the argument that response evaluation must incorporate substantive quality and learning effects. The study also reveals that response quality is multidimensional and that trade-offs exist: strict deadline enforcement can increase templated communication and reduce investigative depth if resources are limited. Consequently, improving effectiveness requires balancing timeliness with remedy adequacy and ensuring that performance management does not distort behavior toward superficial compliance.

Revisiting the research questions, the discussion suggests that complaint mechanisms operate as administrative control most strongly when they create consequences for administrative behavior. Consequences do not necessarily mean punitive sanctions; they can include mandatory escalation, supervisory review, inter-unit accountability, and learning obligations triggered by recurrence. From an agency theory perspective, these consequences align agent behavior with principal interests. From a street-level perspective, they must be feasible given capacity and discretion realities; otherwise, they produce “paper compliance.” From a voice perspective, they maintain the credibility of citizen participation by ensuring that voice leads to repair. The results therefore imply that administrative control is best conceptualized as a governance capacity embedded in workflows, incentives, and learning processes not merely as a channel’s existence.

The study’s objectives and benefits are further reinforced by the discussion of implementation implications (Austin et al., 2024b). For governments, shifting from a closure-centered model to a correction-centered model requires revising the definition of completion. Completion should be tied to evidence of remedy or to documented reasoning when remedies cannot be provided, including clear explanations of constraints and available alternatives. Cross-unit complaints require a designated lead agency and an escalation rule that prevents indefinite re-routing. Recurrence should trigger a different governance mode problem-oriented review rather than case-by-case handling so that complaint analytics become a tool for preventive action (Burke et al., 2022). These practical suggestions are grounded in the findings and directly informed by the theoretical integration: they strengthen voice efficacy, reduce agency misalignment, and support frontline discretion through clearer rules and resources.

Overall, the results and discussion demonstrate that public complaint mechanisms can function as instruments of administrative control, but only under institutional conditions that enable corrective responsiveness and learning. The main problem weak substantive effectiveness despite formal responsiveness is explained by the interaction of voice capture without repair (Hirschman), monitoring without incentive alignment (agency theory), and frontline discretion under constraint (Lipsky). The research

gap overreliance on administrative metrics and under-theorized response quality is addressed by introducing multidimensional indicators and by distinguishing administrative closure from substantive resolution. The study's novelty lies in its end-to-end response chain evaluation and its emphasis on learning loops that convert complaint information into procedural and service improvement. These findings provide a coherent basis for the study's conclusions and support a set of theoretically grounded, academically transferable, and practically actionable recommendations for strengthening government response systems as credible mechanisms of administrative control.

CONCLUSION

This study concludes that public complaint mechanisms can serve as instruments of administrative control, but their effectiveness depends on whether citizen voice is converted into corrective action and organizational learning rather than being processed as a procedural obligation. Drawing on the results and discussion, the complaint system examined in this research demonstrates a consistent pattern: procedural responsiveness is comparatively strong, while substantive responsiveness is uneven. Most complaints receive timely acknowledgment, routing, and formal replies, indicating that the system is operationally capable of managing complaint inflows and meeting basic response standards. However, the system's capacity to deliver durable remedies especially for complex, cross-sector complaints remains limited. As a result, many cases reach "administrative closure" without achieving "substantive resolution," which weakens the control function of complaints and increases the risk of recurring grievances.

The findings confirm that the administrative control potential of complaint mechanisms is strongest at the stage of visibility and traceability. Complaint records create auditable traces that, in principle, reduce information asymmetry between citizens and government units and enable monitoring. Yet the study shows that information alone does not guarantee correction. Effectiveness declines at stages that require verification accuracy, cross-unit coordination, field-level implementation, and learning loops that translate case-level signals into preventive reforms. Misclassification and inappropriate routing are recurring early-stage failures that shape downstream outcomes, while weak escalation rules and fragmented accountability frequently undermine corrective follow-up. These process weaknesses explain why digital platforms can scale communication and documentation but still fail to ensure remedies when problems are multi-agency, resource-dependent, or discretion-sensitive.

Interpreted through Hirschman's voice framework, the complaint mechanism institutionalizes citizen voice but does not consistently empower it to produce organizational repair. Voice is captured efficiently, yet it is often neutralized by standardized replies, narrow interpretations of responsibility, and closure practices that equate responding with resolving. Where complaint signals produced meaningful repair, the pattern was relatively clear: cases were specific, evidence-supported, and attributable to a single unit, enabling rapid corrective action. In these cases, voice functioned as intended as a credible signal that triggered adjustment. In contrast, more complex grievances frequently yielded communicative responsiveness without corrective change, suggesting that voice remains vulnerable to institutional "dampening" when administrative incentives favor closure and risk avoidance.

From an agency theory perspective, the study concludes that the complaint system operates as a monitoring device with misaligned performance incentives. Organizational emphasis on measurable indicators timeliness and closure rates encourages strategies that satisfy reporting requirements but may not satisfy complainants' expectations of remedy. This creates a rational but dysfunctional equilibrium: agencies optimize for compliance with platform standards while the underlying service deficiencies persist. The complaint mechanism, therefore, provides monitoring information but lacks sufficiently strong governance levers credible escalation, outcome-based evaluation, and enforceable ownership of cross-cutting cases to consistently realign agent behavior toward substantive resolution. The control function becomes symbolic when monitoring is decoupled from corrective consequences and learning obligations.

The street-level bureaucracy lens further explains that implementation realities mediate the effectiveness of complaint response systems. Frontline actors exercise discretion under constraints of workload, ambiguity, and limited resources, making coping routines such as templated replies, requests

for additional information, and selective prioritization more likely when deadlines are strict but corrective capacity is under-resourced. The study concludes that reform efforts focused only on platform design or formal procedures will remain insufficient if they do not address the practical conditions under which frontline units can investigate, coordinate, and implement remedies. In this sense, administrative control through complaints is not simply a function of channel availability; it is a function of operational feasibility and discretion governance.

Overall, the research concludes that the central gap between complaint availability and complaint effectiveness is primarily institutional rather than technological. Strengthening complaint mechanisms as administrative control instruments requires redefining “completion” around remedy adequacy and recurrence reduction, not merely communication and closure status. It also requires clearer ownership rules for cross-unit complaints, stronger escalation pathways, minimum standards for substantive response content, and formalized learning loops that convert recurring complaint patterns into SOP revisions, preventive service planning, and targeted capacity improvements. These conclusions directly reflect the study’s empirical evidence that organizational learning is the weakest component of the response chain: complaint analytics exist, but they are not consistently translated into systemic reform.

In contribution terms, this study concludes that complaint system evaluations should move beyond administrative metrics and adopt multidimensional indicators that distinguish communicative responsiveness from corrective responsiveness and administrative closure from substantive resolution. Conceptually, the study strengthens the argument that complaints can operate as institutionalized external control signals only when supported by aligned incentives, feasible implementation capacity, and learning-oriented governance. Practically, the study implies that governments seeking legitimacy and trust through complaint platforms must invest in the corrective infrastructure behind the interface coordination, authority, resourcing, and prevention so that citizen voice produces observable repair. In doing so, complaint mechanisms can more credibly function as instruments of administrative control that reinforce accountability and improve public service performance.

REFERENCES

- Ahn, M. J. (2025). The AI Economy and Public Policy: Updating Porat’s Information Economy Framework in the Era of Artificial Intelligence. In *Public Administration, Governance and Globalization* (pp. 433–451). Springer Nature Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-00514-4_21
- Allan, J. (2022). Mushy Constitutional Principles Enabling Puffed-Up Judicial Policymaking. In *Principled Constitution?* (pp. 75–90). The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group. <https://doi.org/10.5040/9781666983296.ch-4>
- Austin, E. K., Raile, E. D., Wallner, M. P., Peterson, J., Lewandowski, B., Sellegren, B., Kapps, D., Zook, M. V., & Jorgensen, C. (2024a). Broadening the Concept of Value in Science and Technology Innovation Policy: Reconsidering Cooperative Research and Development Agreements as an Expression of Public Value Governance. In *Public Administration Quarterly* (Vol. 49, Number 2, pp. 91–105). SAGE Publications. <https://doi.org/10.1177/07349149241256037>
- Austin, E. K., Raile, E. D., Wallner, M. P., Peterson, J., Lewandowski, B., Sellegren, B., Kapps, D., Zook, M. V., & Jorgensen, C. (2024b). Broadening the Concept of Value in Science and Technology Innovation Policy: Reconsidering Cooperative Research and Development Agreements as an Expression of Public Value Governance. In *Public Administration Quarterly* (Vol. 49, Number 2, pp. 91–105). SAGE Publications. <https://doi.org/10.1177/07349149241256037>
- Bach, T. (2025). Zwischen Innenleben und Außenwirkung des Staates: Verwaltungswissenschaft und Policy-Analyse / Studying the Machine Room of Government and its Societal Impact: Public Administration Research and Policy Analysis. In *dms – der moderne staat – Zeitschrift für Public Policy, Recht und Management* (Vol. 17, Number 2, pp. 202–217). Verlag Barbara Budrich GmbH. <https://doi.org/10.3224/dms.v17i2.02>
- Berkvens, L., Suykens, B., & Verschuere, B. (2025). Who should (not) participate? Public service organisations’ attitudes towards participation in policy-making modes. In *Public Policy and Administration*. SAGE Publications. <https://doi.org/10.1177/09520767251387862>
- Boddy, M. (2025). The public implementation of private housing policy: relations between government and the building societies in the 1970s. In *Policy and Action* (pp. 87–104). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003644729-7>

- Burke, M. P., Gleason, S., Singh, A., & Wilkin, M. K. (2022). Policy, Systems, and Environmental Change Strategies in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program-Education (SNAP-Ed). In *Journal of Nutrition Education and Behavior* (Vol. 54, Number 4, pp. 320–326). Elsevier BV. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jneb.2021.09.008>
- Chandamali, M. N., & Chibesa, Dr. F. (2025). Examining the Capacity of the Local Government to Implement Decentralization Policy: A Case Study of Mwense Town Council. In *International Journal of Advanced Multidisciplinary Research and Studies* (Vol. 5, Number 2, pp. 506–517). OPRA Publications. <https://doi.org/10.62225/2583049x.2025.5.2.3866>
- Christensen, J. (2025). Evidence and Policy-Making: An Organizational Approach. In *Public Administration Review*. Wiley. <https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.70051>
- Donmoyer, R. (2023). Policymaking Pragmatics: What’s a Qualitative Researcher—Especially a *Critical* Qualitative Researcher—to Do? In *Qualitative Inquiry* (Vol. 30, Number 1, pp. 82–91). SAGE Publications. <https://doi.org/10.1177/10778004231163155>
- Elmakias, S. T. (2025). Street-level social workers and social policy: A historical case-study in Israel. In *The British Journal of Social Work* (Vol. 55, Number 7, pp. 3377–3394). Oxford University Press (OUP). <https://doi.org/10.1093/bjsw/bcaf134>
- Frank, E. O., Ubeng, E. E., & Kimeto, J. C. (2025). Conversion of Public Policy: The Common Challenges of Public Administration in Nigeria. In *Journal of Public Administration and Governance* (Vol. 15, Number 2, p. 54). Macrothink Institute, Inc. <https://doi.org/10.5296/jpag.v15i2.23268>
- Grabowska-Moroz, B. (2025a). Constitutional avoidance and values enforcement in the European Union: pattern or policy? In *Sustaining the Rule of Law* (pp. 137–162). Edward Elgar Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781035345472.00011>
- Grabowska-Moroz, B. (2025b). Constitutional avoidance and values enforcement in the European Union: pattern or policy? In *Sustaining the Rule of Law* (pp. 137–162). Edward Elgar Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781035345472.00011>
- Greberman, E., & Berryessa, C. M. (2024). Drug Policy, Drug War, and Disparate Sentencing. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice*. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190264079.013.884>
- Guarnieri, C. (2022). 14. Judicial Independence and Policy Making in Italy. In *The Global Expansion of Judicial Power* (pp. 243–260). New York University Press. <https://doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9780814770078.003.0017>
- Guo, W. (2024). How do policy belief and policy learning influence perceived policy effectiveness in a local CPM policy network? In *Chinese Public Administration Review* (Vol. 15, Number 4, pp. 228–240). SAGE Publications. <https://doi.org/10.1177/15396754241299751>
- Gupta, D. N., & Sushil. (2024a). Innovation in Public Policy and Policy Design Framework. In *Innovation and Institutional Development for Public Policy* (pp. 283–422). Springer Nature Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-3663-8_6
- Gupta, D. N., & Sushil. (2024b). Public Policy: Theories, Process, and Challenges. In *Innovation and Institutional Development for Public Policy* (pp. 123–208). Springer Nature Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-3663-8_4
- Haldeman, L. (2025). Highlighting the Importance of Policy, Systems and Environmental Change Interventions in Nutrition Education and Behavior. In *Journal of Nutrition Education and Behavior* (Vol. 57, Number 1, p. 5). Elsevier BV. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jneb.2024.11.002>
- Holston, D., & Greene, M. (2023). The LSU AgCenter Healthy Communities Initiative: Community-Participatory Policy, Systems, and Environmental Change. In *Journal of Nutrition Education and Behavior* (Vol. 55, Number 5, pp. 381–386). Elsevier BV. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jneb.2023.02.003>
- Houghtaling, B., Balis, L., Pradhananga, N., Cater, M., & Holston, D. (2023). Implementation Strategies for Extension’s Rural Healthy Eating and Active Living Policy, Systems, and Environmental Changes. In *Journal of Nutrition Education and Behavior* (Vol. 55, Number 7, p. 109). Elsevier BV. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jneb.2023.05.232>
- Jiang, C. en, Xiong, anyuan, & Yu, H. (2024). Research on the Identity of English Normal Students in the Western Region Under the “Double Reduction” Policy: A Case Study of S Normal University. In *Journal of Humanities, Arts and Social Science* (Vol. 8, Number 7, pp. 1798–1806). Hill Publishing Group Inc. <https://doi.org/10.26855/jhass.2024.07.046>

- Jones, S. M. (2023). Lifting the Veil: Utilizing Critical Qualitative Inquiry to Demystify the Public Policymaking Process. In *Qualitative Inquiry* (Vol. 30, Number 1, pp. 30–39). SAGE Publications. <https://doi.org/10.1177/10778004231163161>
- Kazharski, A. (2024). Book Review: The Sense of Mission in Russian Foreign Policy: Destined for Greatness! Alicja Curanović. *The Sense of Mission in Russian Foreign Policy: Destined for Greatness!* London: Routledge & CRC Press, 2021. 248 p, ISBN 9780367675073. In *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* (Vol. 50, Number 2, pp. 529–531). SAGE Publications. <https://doi.org/10.1177/03043754241247443>
- Lebron, C. N., Mitsdarffer, M., Parra, A., Chavez, J. V., & Behar-Zusman, V. (2023). Latinas and Maternal and Child Health: Research, Policy, and Representation. In *Maternal and Child Health Journal* (Vol. 29, Number 8, pp. 1167–1176). Springer Science and Business Media LLC. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10995-023-03662-z>
- Lee, M. (2024). The Economic Impact of the Actually Living Population Policy: A Qualitative Study on Small Business Owners' Perceptions and Policy Acceptance. In *Studies on Humanities and Social Sciences* (Vol. 6, Number 6, pp. 1099–1116). International Society for Humanities and Social Studies. <https://doi.org/10.62783/shss.6.6.72>
- Marengo, A., & Kern, D. (2025). Policymaking in multilevel governance: how local governments adopt sustainable development policies in Brazil. In *Frontiers in Political Science* (Vol. 7). Frontiers Media SA. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2025.1580685>
- Nair, A. R., Kamalasan, S., & Smith, M. (2023). Integrated Policy-Driven Adaptive Control Framework for Grid-Tied Inverters per Frequency Decomposition Based Optimization. In *2023 IEEE International Conference on Power Electronics, Smart Grid, and Renewable Energy (PESGRE)* (pp. 1–6). IEEE. <https://doi.org/10.1109/pesgre58662.2023.10404578>
- Pandey, S. K. (2025). Policy-driven Innovation: How Government Incentives are Shaping the EV Start-up Landscape in India. In *Indian Journal of Public Administration* (Vol. 71, Number 3, pp. 620–634). SAGE Publications. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00195561251370519>
- Podgórska-Rykała, J. (2024). Public policy. In *Deliberative Democracy, Public Policy, and Local Government* (pp. 89–123). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781032670799-4>
- Ručinská, S., Mitaľ, O., & Fečko, M. (2025). Disinformation in Public Policy: The Case of Slovakia. In *Governance and Public Management* (pp. 155–186). Springer Nature Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-81425-9_8
- Tkach, D. (2025). Public Governance of Energy Policy: Evidence from the Visegrád Group Countries. In *Public Administration 4.0: Leveraging Digital Tools for Effective Governance* (pp. 206–240). Scientific Center of Innovative Research. <https://doi.org/10.36690/pubadm-206-240>
- Ussulor, C. (2025). *ARBITRABILITY OF CRIMINAL MATTERS: THE LAW, POLICY, AND REFORM*. Elsevier BV. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5387406>
- Vasilescu, C. M. (2022). Participatory Governance and Restorative Justice: What Potential Blending in Environmental Policymaking? In *The Palgrave Handbook of Environmental Restorative Justice* (pp. 171–200). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-04223-2_8
- Xie, J., Vorobev, P., Yang, R., & Nguyen, H. D. (2025). Battery Health-Informed and Policy-Aware Deep Reinforcement Learning for EV-Facilitated Distribution Grid Optimal Policy. In *IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid* (Vol. 16, Number 1, pp. 704–717). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). <https://doi.org/10.1109/tsg.2024.3460486>
- Zeraatpisheh, A., & Aggarwal, J. (2025). Narratives at the Core: Nuclear Energy Policy, Innovation, and Risk in the U.S. Transition Era. In *Public Administration Quarterly*. SAGE Publications. <https://doi.org/10.1177/07349149251396859>